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NOTES
INSOLVENCY OF DEFENDANT AS BASIS OF EQUITY
JURISDICTION
In considering the question of whether the insolvency of a
defendant is alone sufficient to enable one to obtain equitable relief, it will be well to divide the cases on the subject into two
principal groups, namely, cases involving a Tort, and, cases
involving a Contract.
Further classification is more difficult, but for the purpose
of this study, the Tort group of cases may well be further subdivided into: (1) those dealing with waste, (2) those dealing
with trespass in the nature of waste, and (3) those dealing simply with trespass.
Although trespass in the nature of waste is treated by many
courts as waste, thus tearing down the old rule that waste must
be committed by one rightfully in possession, the cases here
will be dealt with separately as of the old classification.
Under the Contract group of cases, the question as to the
suffcieney of insolvency alone as a ground of obtaining specific
performance will be considered.
(1) The pure waste cases logically divide themselves into
two groups; the first consisting of cases in which waste has merely been threatened, and the second consisting of those cases in
which the waste has already occurred.
(a) We shall look at some of the threatened waste cases before considering those in which the waste has occurred. These
cases of threatened waste seem generally to hold that an injunction will lie to restrain waste even where the wrongdoer is
solvent. In other words the plaintiff may get equitable relief
in cases of this particular kind without alleging the insolvency
of the wrongdoer. Thus it appears that insolvency is not
necessary here, and is therefore of no consideration.
In Brigham v. Overstreet1 an action was brought by the
owner of property against his tenant. The defendant threatened
to remove permanent fixtures, which act would amount to waste.
1128 Ga. 264, 57 S. E. 484 (1907).
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The plaintiff sought an injunction. An injunction was granted,
and the court said, at page 488, that an injunction to stay or
prevent waste has been held to be proper regardless of the question as to whether the damages threatened would be irreparable
and without reference to the solvency or insolvency of the party
sought to be enjoined.
In accord may be found Fuller v. Montafi.2 In this case,
an action by one cotenant against another, the cutting of trees
was held to be waste, and it was held that equity would interfere.
No insolvency was alleged. Pardeev. Camden Lumber Co. 3 was
cited as authority for prevention of waste or trespass in the nature of waste by injunction.
Likewise in Starks v. Redfield4 which was an action to enjoin
waste brought by a mortgagee against a mortgagor, the court
said that waste which diminished the value of the security was
sufficient to entitle the plaintiff to an injunction without averring
the defendant's insolvency.
These cases and others in which the courts expressed similar views seem to hold that equity will interfere to stay and
restrain waste regardless of the wrongdoer's financial status.
Therefore, in situations of this sort, it can never be said that the
insolvency of the defendant is the lone factor which gives equity
jurisdiction.
(b) And now we come to the consideration of those cases
in which the waste has already occurred.
Will equity enjoin the removal of trees, etc., after these
have been converted into personalty, the defendant being insolvent?
The statement in Clark's "Principles of Equity" '5 to the
effect that "where waste has consisted in creating chattels by
severance from the soil, equity will not enjoin their removal
from the land even though an injunction against future severance is asked and given, unless the defendant is insolvent or
special circumstances appear" would seem to indicate that in
that eminent authority's opinion, the defendant's insolvency
might be the principal factor in giving equity jurisdiction in
such cases.
2 55 Cal. App. 314, 203 Pac. 406 (1921).
370 W. Va. 68, 73 S. E. 82 (1911).
'52 Wis. 349, 9 N. W. 168 (1881).
5See. 189.
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However in Watson v. Hunter in which the plaintiffs seek
an injunction to restrain the defendants from cutting timber
and from removing that already cut, the court said that equity
will interfere to restrain the defendant from cutting more timber, but will not interfere to prevent him from removing that
already cut. Although the insolvency of the defendant was not
alleged here, it does not appear that his insolvency would have
made any difference.
The authority on this particular point is scarce, but the
rule seems to be that inisolvency alone is not enough to evoke
equitable aid in restraining asportation of personalty.
(2) We now approach the second major group of the Tort
cases, namely those involving trespass in the nature of waste.
In this type of case, the insolvency of the wrongdoer seems
to be of no serious consideration as being a ground for equitable
intervention, when the title to the land is not in dispute.
A very strong case on this point is that of Pardee v. Camden
Lumber Co.7 in which case it was held that an injunction would
lie to restrain a trespasser from cutting timber on the plaintiff's
land even though such trespasser was solvent.
This case overruled previous West Virginia cases, which
held that the added element of insblvency was necessary in order
to give equity jurisdiction. The court regarded timber as being
unique and part of the realty, and when once cut, no matter of
damages could reconvert it into timber. The court went so far
as to say that it thought that a clear case of trespass by cutting
trees should always be enjoined.
In Bettes v. Browers the defendant was committing trespass
in the nature of waste by severing standing timber to which the
plaintiff had title. The plaintiff alleged the defendant's insolvency, and the court, at page 346, declared that equity had
jurisdiction in such cases regardless of the defendant's insolvency.
In accord is Tidwell v. Hitt TLtmber Co.9 where it was held
that a plaintiff land owner was entitled to an injunction against
a trespasser cutting the plaintiff's timber even though the defendant was able to respond in damages.
:9 Amer. Dec. 225 (1821); 5 Johns Ch. 169.
"70 W. Va. 68, 73 S. E. 82 (1911).
8184 Fed. 342 (1911).
p198 Ala. 236, 73 So. 486 (1916).
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Walsh, in his work on "Equity,"' 1 says, "The acts of a
trespasser without title causing permanent damage, which would
be waste if done by a tenant for life or for years, will be enjoined in equity everywhere because the damages would be inadequate just as the damages are inadequate for similar acts
by a tenant. The cutting of timber causes permanent destruction, and will be enjoined irrespective of the money value of
the timber. Any taking away of the corpus of the land, provided it actually results in substantial and permanent harm will
be enjoined, though the courts have refused to interfere in cases
where the damage, if any, would be very slight, or where the
trespass is not in the nature of waste and will be neither continuous nor repeated indefinitely so as to ripen into an easement."'1
Other cases seem to indicate that insolvency is sometimes
an important factor in evoking equitable aid in cases of trespass in the nature of waste. For instance in Hanly v. Watterson12 the plaintiff sought an injunction to restrain a defendant
trespasser from cutting and removing timber to which he was
alleged to have no title, and the court said that equity would
enjoin a trespasser to real property where good title in the
plaintiff is alleged, and it is also alleged in the bill that the
defendant is insolvent, because in such cases the party could
have no adequate remedy at law.
In line with this last case is West v. Walker' 3 where equitable relief was refused a plaintiff whose timber was being cut
by a trespasser. The court assigned as the reason for refusal
that there was not sufficient proof of irreparable injury,
and that there was conflict in title. It went on to say that if
the plaintiff would clearly establish title, then equity might
interpose to prevent multiplicity of suits, and insinuated that
an allegation of the defendant's insolvency might be an added
factor in gaining equitable interposition.
There are other old decisions to the effect that the insolvency
of the defendant may be an important consideration in cases of
trespass in the nature of waste, but the later authority appears
10Walsh on Equity, See. 29; 54 Conn. 67, 5 Atl. 858 (1886); 182 I1.
192, 55 N. E. 50.
1130 At. 251; 52 N. E. 736.
39 W. Va. 214, 19 S. E. 536 (1894).
3 N. J. Equity 279 (1835).
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to be contra. In the more recent cases the tendency seems to be
to consider trespass in the nature of waste in much the same
light as pure waste. Consequently it follows that not only is
insolvency never alone enough in this type of case, but it
is not even a consideration. It is not necessary.
(3) Passing on to the third major group of Tort cases,
namely that group involving trespass not of the "trespass in
nature of waste" type, we might well divide this into two minor
groups, to wit, that group in which the trespass is single, and
that in which it is repeated or continued.
(a) Regarding the cases in which the threatened trespass
is single, we find that equity refuses to give relief, even though
the defendant in such cases is insolvent.
Walsh, on Equity,14 says that equity will not restrain a
wrongdoer from threatened wrong merely because he could not
satisfy a judgment that might be recovered against him. If
this were otherwise, there would be thrown into equity practically the entire field of tortious liability, as inadequacy of damages
could be readily established in probably a majority of Tort cases
by alleging and proving the defendant's irresponsibility.
Pomeroy's "Equity Jurisprudence, "15 says that if a trespass to property is a single act and is temporary in nature and
effect so that an action at law for damages is adequate, equity
will not interfere.
This rule seems to indicate that where the defendant is insolvent, equity may interfere, but the majority of authority is
to the effect that the insolvency of the defendant alone will
not give equity jurisdiction in cases of single threatened trespass. 16 There must be some other ground.
(b) A study of the cases which involve threatened repeated or continued trespasses reveals that equitable relief is always
given in these situations when the defendant is insolvent, and
is given in some cases when the defendant is solvent.
For instance in Missouri R. R. Co. v. Hobbs17 where an injunction was sought to restrain an insolvent defendant from
peddling food on the plaintiff's premises, it was held that equity
has jurisdiction to prevent repeated trespasses upon property by
11Sec. 63.
"Sec. 1537.
32 A. L. R. 494; 14 R. C. L. 59.
"178 Ark. 1146, 13 S. W. (2d) 610 (1929).
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injunction where the remedy at law for damages is inadequate,
and to avoid multiplicity of suits, especially when the wrongdoer
is insolvent.
In Woodstock Operating Corp. v. Quinn 8 where the bill
was to enjoin the defendant from hurling debris on the plaintiff's
land, the court said that the jurisdiction of a court of equity to
prevent trespass on land by injunction will take account of the
financial status of the defendant as bearing on his ability to
respond in damages when the nature of the trespass is not irreparable.
Likewise in Martin v. Davis'9 where an insolvent defendant
went on the plaintiff's land, and plowed, and threatened to continue, the court held that an injunction would lie to prevent
the defendant from so doing.
And in Colliton v. Oxborough20 in which a solvent defendant
trespassed on the plaintiff's land and threatened to continue,
the court said that the remedy at law was not adequate, for
although each act of trespass would not be destructive of the
freehold, and the legal remedy would be adequate if each act
stood alone, equity will prevent the wrong by injunction, because the injured party has not a complete and adequate remedy
by one action at law for the entire wrong.
This last case allows the plaintiff to get into equity on repeated trespasses alone. Following this authority it would seem
that the insolvency of the defendant in cases of this sort would
be unnecessary and not even good as a makeweight.
But in the cases where the trespass is a continuing one, the
situation is different. In the case of Boyden v. Bragow21 the
plaintiff sought an injunction to compel the defendant to remove
a tombstone erected upon the plaintiff's lot. Here equity would
not interfere to compel the defendant to remove the stone when
the cost to the plaintiff for such removal could be computed.
In Eno v. Christ22 the action was for an injunction to compel the defendant to remove dirt which the defendant had placed
on the plaintiff's lot. An injunction was given here because
damages could not be estimated.
201 Ala. 681, 79 So. 253 (1918).
96 Iowa 718, 65 N. W. 1001 (1896).
-86 Minn. 361, 90 N. W. 793 (1902).
- 53 N. J. Eq. 26, 30 At. 330 (1894).
54 N. Y. Supp. 400; 25 Misc. Rep. 24 (1898).
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The rule seems to be that in cases of this type where the
damages can be estimated, the remedy at law is held to be adequate even though the defendant is insolvent and unable to
respond in damages. It follows that insolvency of the defendant in cases of this type is not enough.
A few cases appear to hold that the defendant's insolvency
alone is sufficient to evoke equitable relief,2 3 but in all of these
there were the ever-present repeated trespasses. The majority
of the authorities, however, state that in cases of threatened
repeated trespasses, insolvency is only a makeweight, and is
24
not enough alone.
We now approach the second grand division of our study,
namely, the question as to whether insolvency alone is sufficient
ground to give equity jurisdiction to compel specific performance
of a contract. A glance over the authority on this point discloses that it is not.
In Chaffee v. Sprague25 the bill was to compel the transfer
of stock. The defendant in her lifetime executed a deed of
trust to the plaintiff, promising that her stock should be transferred to the plaintiff upon demand, by way of securing performance of the conditions of the deed. The defendant died, and
the plaintiff demanded the stock. The administrator refused to
deliver it. The estate was insolvent. It was held that equity
had jurisdiction in such cases, but would not grant relief to
the plaintiff because his claim was not superior to those of other
creditors. Where an estate is insolvent, equity will not enforce
a trust agreement which will operate as a preference against
other creditors.
In McLaughlin v. Piatti26 the suit was for specific performance of a contract to sell personalty. The defendant was insolvent. The injunction was refused, and the court said specifically that the insolvency of the defendant was never a ground for
equitable jurisdiction. At 453, the court said that the inadequacy of damages was not founded on the idea that the party
may not from the insolvency of the vendor be enabled to col2152 Cal. 322; 18 Cal. 206; 44 Pac. 666; 22 S. E. 940; 89 Ga. 824;
30 L.4 R. A. 98.
32 A. L. R. 494; 10 R. C. L. 20; 14 R. C. L. 59; 32 0. .44.
13 AtI. 121 (1888).
-27 Cal. 451 (1865).
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lect his judgment for damages, but that damages when collected
would not afford a complete remedy.
So in Knott v. Shepherdstoum Mfg. C0.27 where the suit
was to enforce a contract, and the defendant was insolvent, the
court said, in refusing an injunction, that this remedy was inadequate by the reason of the insolvency of the defendant, but
the reply to this objection is that courts do not provide the
means to pay debts but the means of enforcing their payment,
regardless of the solvency or insolvency of the defendant.
Williston, on Contracts, 28 states that for a court to decree
specific performance of the contract because of the defendant's
insolvency is not only a violation of the maxim that equality
equals equity, but is nothing less than ordering the debtor to do
something which the Bankrupt Act has forbidden. If the defendant's financial condition may properly have a bearing on
the plaintiff's right to specific performance, not insolvency but
lack of property which can be seized would be the test. He also
states that if insolvency stands alone as the only real danger
urged in the plaintiff's complaint for equitable relief, then he
must fail. An insolvent may make a transfer for any return
other than a pre-existing debt, if honestly bargained for as an
equivalent, but if the insolvent, prior to performance on his
part, has already received the whole or part of the consideration
for his own promised performance, so that a debt or obligation
is due him, the situation is different. In that event, insolvency
can never properly be a makeweight for the decision of a court.
*Unlessa contract for specific chattel property gives an equitable
property right in the chattel, or unless the decree requires the
plaintiff to make a full contemporaneous exchange for the property in question, equity should not enforce the contract specifically because of insolvency. To do so is inconsistent with
bankruptcy laws.
In 36 Cyc. 564 it is said that the fact that damages cannot be collected because of the defendant's insolvency is mentioned in a few cases as ground for relief, but in a few only has
it been held to be the only ground.
In Pomeroy's "Specific Performance,'"29 it is said that the
reason for specific performance sometimes advanced, to wit,
230

W. Va. 790, 5 S. E. 266 (1888).

28Sec. 1420.
21Sec. 26.
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because a law court could not give the property but only give
a remedy in damages, the beneficial effect of which must depend
on the personal responsibility of the party, is objectionable, because under this principal, equity's aid would at times be extended to every kind of contract, but would never be extended to
all contracts of any particular class. The aid would not depend
upon the nature in terms of the contract sought to be enforced,
but upon the pecuniary condition of the party.
Walsh, on "Equity",30 says on the subject that the mere
fact of the defendant's insolvency alone certainly is not enough
to give equitable relief in the form of specific performance, but
may throw the balance in favor of equitable relief when without it the court may have decided against specific performance.
But insolvency should not be permitted to sway the court's decision, when the result would be a preference contrary to bankrupt law.
Thus it is seen that the authority is to the effect that insolvency alone is not sufficient ground for equitable intervention to compel specific performance of a contract. In all of the
cases which have been reviewed, in which equity has interferred,
there have been other elements present. In Contract as in Tort
insolvency is at best a makeweight.
By way of summary, we may say that insolvency is of no
consequence as a factor in the giving of jurisdiction to equity
to stay and restrain waste, as equity has jurisdiction in cases of
this sort regardless of the wrongdoer's financial status.
In those cases where waste Jhas already occurred, insolvency
alone is not sufficient to evoke equitable intervention to prevent
the carrying away of the waste material.
Where an injury to realty has been perpetrated by a trespasser (trespass in the nature of waste) the role is the same as
in cases of pure waste. Insolvency is not necessary.
In cases of single threatened trespass, equity will not interfere on the lone ground of the defendant's insolvency.
Where there is threatened repeated or continuing trespasses,
when the damage can be estimated, the remedy at law is held to
be adequate even though the defendant is insolvent and unable
to respond in damages. Thus it follows that in these cases insolvency alone is not enough.
I Sec. 63; 27 Cal. 452; 201 Ala. 356, 78 So. 212 (1918); 36 Cyc. 564.
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The weight of authority is to the effect that the defendant's
insolvency alone is not a sufficient ground to evoke equitable aid
in compelling specific performance of a contract.
Despite the weight of authority, the writer cannot help but
be impressed by the views on the subject set forth by Horack
in his law review article "Insolvency and Specific Performance, "31 to the effect that the test of the inadequacy of the
remedy at law should be the same whether the case involves Contract or Tort. In either case the remedy should put the plaintiff in the same condition as before. Equity should be satisfied
with no less relief. 'Where relief can be given to the plaintiff
without prejudicing the rights of others, the insolvency of the
defendants bringing on inadequacy of legal remedy may be the
sole ground upon which equity may be induced to exercise its
jurisdiction.
Equally impressive is the view advanced by Lawrence in
Section 79 of his work on "Equity."
Here he states that the
insolvency of a party against whom a remedy is sought has
been deemed to render the remedy inadequate. On what plausible ground can it be contended that a judgment against any
insolvent is an adequate remedy? If a party injured by breach
of a contract cannot avail himself of his remedy at law for any
beneficial purpose, or if it be doubtful, equity ought to compel
specific performance.
These viewpoints appear to be more in harmony with the
practical character of equitable relief than those which represent the weight of authority.
J. F. CoNLEY, Attorney at Law,
Carlisle, Kentucky.
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